WERE CROATIA (AND SLOVENIA) GUILTY OF SECESSION?

Even today the main reason for the disintegration of Yugoslavia is not clear to many people. Slobodan Milosevic and his military and political leadership insisted (and still insist) that international documents should specify as the main reason for the dissolution of Tito's Yugoslavia "the secession of Croatia and Slovenia". Their reasons were twofold: firstly, Serbia and Montenegro could then go on figuring as the successor state to Yugoslavia; secondly, they might appear to be justified - even retrospectively - in using force first against Slovenia, subsequently, in an even more violent fashion, against Croatia, and finally against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following its declaration of independence Slovenia had attempted to take over customs posts on its frontiers although at the same time expressing a wish for the confederative reform of the Socialist Federal Republic. The Serbian military leadership at once declared this to be an act of secession, and used it as the pretext for an armed attack "to protect the territorial integrity and identity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". The outcome for the Serbian political and military leadership was catastrophic. The war against Slovenia lasted no more than a few days and ended with a relatively limited degree of destruction and relatively few casualties. Considering the brief duration of the campaign, its coverage in the media and the fact that the Slovenian "fire brigade" managed to thrash the mighty Yugoslav National Army, it seemed likely that the Army had no heart for a military operation in Slovenia. The suggestion was even made that the conflict had been no more than a kind of charade. In fact, the plan for a Greater Serbia had never involved the inclusion of Slovenia. On the other hand, the former head of the Yugoslav Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS), Aleksandar Vasiljevic, claims that the Yugoslav Army had a detailed plan for the removal of the Slovene as well as the Croatian leadership. The plan allegedly involved the arrest of President Milan Kucan and Dr. Franjo Tudman, together with the entire leadership of the two republics ("NIN", 12 June 1992). But, judging by events, it appears that the proponents of the "preservation of Yugoslavia", i.e. the champions and advocates of Serbian expansionism, were not particularly interested in a Yugoslavia that included Slovenia.

In keeping with its century-old "national megalomania Serbia even today lays claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to a large part of Croatia, up to a line running from Virovitica through Karlovac to Karlobag.

As long ago as 1844 Ilija Garasanin, the progenitor of Serbia's national policy and the founder of Serbian expansionism, wrote that the central aim of Serbian policy must be "not to confine itself within its present frontiers, but to seek to embrace all those Serbian populations that surrounded it" (Ilija Garaganin, "A Draft / A Programme for the Foreign and National Policy of Serbia at the end of 1844"). A century later, a new champion of Serbian expansionism, Stevan Moljevic left a note to the effect that the Serbs had "the duty, first and foremost, to create and organise a homogeneous Serbia which would incorporate the entire ethnic territory where Serbs live, to secure its strategic centres and lines of communications as well as an economic base that will provide there free economic, political and cultural existence for all time" (Stevan Moljevic, "A Homogeneous Serbia"). Serbia was particularly attracted by the prospect of annexing the Croatian parts of the Adriatic coast.

This is why the declaration of independence by Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen by Serbia as an attack on its vital interests. Its aggression was meant to bring those republics to heel but also to unite all Serbs in one state. The proclamation of independence by the new states was used by Serbia as a pretext to destroy them by force of arms and to keep them in Yugoslavia.

Serbia had already prepared itself intellectually for a final showdown with the non-Serbian nations of Yugoslavia. There is ample evidence of this in the press and in articles in periodicals, both in Yugoslavia and abroad. These articles are suffused with hatred of the non-Serbian nations of Yugoslavia, they glorify alleged Serbian sacrifices and call for retribution and revenge. The following excerpt is both typical and prophetic:

"Vengeance, then, must be the main political aim that takes precedence over all others... Since such vengeance is not feasible at the moment, our political tactics must be so framed that we and the Croats are placed in a situation where revenge will be possible... Those who wish to be revenged on the Croats because of what has happened in the past ought to seek the preservation of Yugoslavia, because it is only within a common political structure that this revenge may be most effectively accomplished... It might easily be staged in the form of major political unrest calling logically for a restoration of public order in such circumstances that the Croats are at a disadvantage, let us say without weapons or other technical and organisational means of defence." (Dr. Kajica Milanov: "Serbian Thought", Melbourne 1969). In Croatia the course of events was such that it might have been dictated by Milanov. Disturbances were systematically arranged so as to provide the pretext for "a restoration of public order". The Federal Army first of all armed those sections of the Serbian population which had been indoctrinated with the Greater Serbia idea. These groups then set about creating chaos in Croatia by blocking roads and wrecking railway lines, stopping and molesting travellers, sniping and murdering. These acts of banditry were accompanied by propaganda against Croats and the new Croatian government as an alleged threat to the Serbs. All this came to a head with a "spontaneous" rising in Knin against the new Croatian authorities. In order that the Serbian aggression might be staged as intervention to restore order with the Croats being placed at maximum disadvantage, it had been arranged that they should be unarmed and virtually defenceless. The Yugoslav National Army had first of all disarmed the Croatian territorial defence force (which every republic had as a peacetime element of the National Army). The Army was then able to enter on the scene as the restorer of order.

The war waged by the Serbs in Croatia was represented at that time (and is still being represented) as a defence of Serbian rights through the use of armed force. Serbia took cover behind the Yugoslav Army and the federal institutions. The "secession" of Croatia was nothing but a pretext for the use of force. When their ultimate plan failed, the Serbs settled for those parts of Croatia they had already seized (and which had by then been "cleansed" of Croats), and they assented to the arrival of UN troops. They were then at liberty to direct their aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. While UNPROFOR guarded their conquests in the Croatian "regions", the Serbs transferred their troops and equipment to the neighbouring republic without the slightest hindrance. They then continued even more ferociously the process that had begun in Croatia.