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Jajcinovic, Mladen Klemencic, Andjelko Milardovic, Gorazd Nikic, Fran Visnar Editor: Dr. Gorazd Nikic Translator: W.E. Yuill Published by: AGM, Zagreb 1994 C O N T E N T S
UNPROFOR IN CROATIA
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| UNPA sector | including regions | counties and boroughs | status before UNPROFOR | national mix | UN contingent from |
| East | Baranja E. Slavonia, Srijem | Beli Manastir, Vukovar, part of Osijek, part of Vinkovci | occupied | Croat majority, Serbs 35%, Hungarians | Russia, Belgium |
| West | W. Slavonia | Grubisno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac, part of Novska, part of N. Gradiska | mainly under Croat control | equal numbers of Serbs and Croats | Canada, Jordan, Nepal, Argent. |
| North | Banija, Kordun | Kostajnica, Dvor, Petrinja, Glina, Vrginmost, Vojnic, Slunj | occupied | Serbian majority, Croats 35% | Nigeria, Denmark, Poland |
| South | E. Lika, N. Dalmatia | T. Korenica, D. Lapac, Gracac, Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac | occupied | Serbian majority, Croats 21% | Czech R., Slovakia, France, Kenia |
The entire area under the protection of the United Nations was divided for operational purposes into four sectors: Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Srijem were designated UNPA Sector East. It included the municipalities of Beli Manastir, Vukovar and parts of the municipalities of Osijek and Vinkovci, but not those towns themselves. Sector East is identical in area with the occupied territory of that part of Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population of Sector East had a Croat majority (44.5%), with Serbs representing 35% of the population.
Western Slavonia was designated UNPA Sector West. The southern part includes occupied parts of the municipalities of Novska, Nova Gradiska and Pakrac, where, in 1991, Serbs formed the largest ethnic group. The larger, northern part of this sector includes the municipalities of Daruvar and Grubisno Polje, areas which had not previously been occupied, and where Croats were in a majority compared with Serbs. The census of Sector West as a whole showed Serbs and Croats as evenly balanced.
UNPA Sector North comprised the occupied municipalities of Kordun and Banija. The 1991 position here was 34.7% Croats and 58.0% Serbs. Thus there was just over 50% Serbs in the sector as a whole while in certain parts for example the municipality of Slunj - Croats were in the majority.
UNPA Sector South comprised the municipalities of Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica and Gracac in the eastern part of Lika and Obrovac, Benkovac and Knin in northern Dalmatia. According to the 1991 census, the proportion of Serbs in that part of Croatia was 75.7% and of Croats 21.2%.
Although the original plan had not provided for this, the situation on the ground made it necessary for UNPROFOR to take control of the so-called "pink zones". This term was applied to parts of Croatian territory or parts of particular counties or municipalities outside UNPA which remained under Serbian control after the cessation of hostilities. The most extensive "pink zones" were established round Sector South. They included the occupied parts of the municipalities of Sinj, Drnis, Sibenik, Zadar, Gospic and Otocac. In all these municipalities Croats were in a majority. Pink zones were also designated in occupied parts of the municipalities of Ogulin, Duga Resa, Karlovac and Sisak, which also had Croat majorities. No pink zones were designated in UNPA Sectors East and West.
Defects of the Peace-keeping Plan
The plan was well-intentioned but defective in approach. Its initial aims were the achievement of peace, security and respect for human rights, including the return of refugees and displaced persons who had been forced to leave their homes on account of the war. False, however, was the assumption that tensions and conflict in those areas with mixed populations had arisen because the security and human rights of the local Serbs had been threatened by the Croatian declaration of independence. This was the Serbian argument, but the Croatian side showed quite clearly that the local risings among the Serbian population in Croatia were merely part of a wider Serbian and Army strategy to impose their solution of the "Yugoslav crisis" on Croatia by force of arms. The basic problem was actually how to protect Croatia from Serbian aggression, not how to protect the Serbian population from possible excesses on the part of the Croatian authorities. This latter problem can be solved only when the basic problem of the aggression on Croatia which in large measure involves the local Serbs, has been dealt with. This is why the Croatian side was on the whole dissatisfied with the Vance plan. However, it did see in the plan, in conjunction with wider political and diplomatic moves, one means of securing the integrity and independence of Croatia in a peaceful manner without further destruction and loss of life. With acceptance of the Vance plan Croatia's struggle for international recognition began.
The Serbian side, on the other hand, continued its military operations, seeking to consolidate by force its hold on Croatian territory before definitive discussion could be held on the implementation of the Vance plan.
After setback in some areas and faced with the prospect of imminent international recognition of Croatia, the Serbian side agreed in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992 to a cessation of hostilities. Wishing to sign a peace plan before Croatia was internationally recognised, the Serbs gave assurances that they accepted the plan and would cooperate unreservedly in its implementation, at the same time seeking additional guarantees for Serbian communities in Croatia.
At this point the UN committed a fatal error which was to be paid for later and which represented the greatest obstacle to the carrying out of the Vance plan. From alleged concern for the Serbian communities that would come under UN protection, instead of seeking guarantees from the Croats, whose territory and population were involved, Goulding gave his own interpretation of the status of the "protected areas" in the name of the UN, stating that the UN peacekeeping mission would not end until a "comprehensive solution of the Yugoslav political crisis" was found and that the deployment of UN forces would not alter the status quo, so that the laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia would not apply in areas under UN protection. An interpretation on these lines was entirely at odds with the spirit and sense of the Vance plan and with the thinking of the arbitration commission under the chairmanship of R. Badinter, according to which the borders of Croatia had to be regarded as internationally recognised frontiers, with the local Serbian communities having no right of self-determination. Goulding's interpretation called in question the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, encouraged Serbian separatist aspiration and limited the effectiveness of the UN peace-keeping forces by requiring them to seek the consent of Serbian local authorities which had been installed by force of arms. The Croats protested and incorporated in the Croatian constitution amendments on the protection of human rights and the rights of ethnic communities, including international supervision of these rights. However, this had no real influence on the Goulding interpretation of the status of the "protected areas". Indeed, Goulding's guarantee merely encouraged the insurgent forces to ignore the constitutional guarantees offered by the Croatian government.
In the meantime the process leading to the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia continued. A high degree of co-operation and the guarantees given by Croatia in its constitutional arrangements regarding human and ethnic rights, with special provision for the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia, speeded up the process of recognition of the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state within its existing frontiers, as well as its admission to the United Nations and other international bodies. Vance's peace plan had explicitly stated that it would not prejudice an ultimate political solution. It ought now to have been modified to take account of new political factors which had been internationally endorsed, but the UN representatives clung rigidly to the original scheme, which was now no longer relevant, thus prejudicing their attitude to the new facts of the political situation. Waiting for an "overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis" in a situation where the Yugoslav state no longer existed, while new states on its territory had gained internationally recognised independent status - was tantamount to fostering an illusion which implicitly supported Serbian expansionism.
Lengthy and arduous discussions on this point were held with representatives of the United Nations, and the Croatian leadership repeatedly pointed out the risk of the peace plan being blocked and compromised. The lack of any clear view of the political processes that had led to the crisis and the manner in which the international community might cope with it threw the United Nations into a state of confusion and inertia that was to the advantage of that side in the conflict which had superior force at its command. The Croatian side clearly saw this danger, but it had little choice other than to accept the Vance plan: it could not risk wrecking it and then being accused of rejecting a peaceful solution. Besides, it relied on the logic of the peace plan itself and the impartiality of those who would implement it.
The Deployment of UNPROFOR
On the basis of Security Council Resolution 740 of 7 February and 743 of 21 February 1992, UNPROFOR's operations began with the arrival in Croatia of 50 liaison officers led by Colonel Wilson. This group was augmented by the despatch of a further 25 officers, and on 10 March 1992 the UNPROFOR advance guard under the command of General Satish Nambiar and his staff arrived in Zagreb. Separate agreements on the deployment of UNPROFOR were arrived at with the government of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Croatian government. Sarajevo was chosen as UNPROFOR headquarters, although the peace- keeping operation was to be mounted in Croatia. This arrangement was further evidence of the UN's muddled ideas on relations within Yugoslavia and the status of Croatia. It allowed the Serbian side to prevent Croatia being defined in terms of its statehood and to have its territory defined as if it did not include the whole of its area as a sovereign state. UN concessions to the Serbian side were prompted by the need to co-operate with the Yugoslav authorities and local Serbian authorities, but they affected many issues of principle and were not acceptable to the Croats. In defining the agreement on the status of UNPROFOR in Croatia, the Croat side put forward a number of objections in principle, especially in regard to the official record and the definition of certain concepts, so that the agreement was never in fact signed. In its declarations of 10 and 21 February the government of the Republic of Croatia announced that, in accepting the overall plan of UN peace-keeping operations in Croatia, it could accept no responsibility beyond the scope of that plan, or for arbitrary interpretations of the plan, and that it considered that only the laws and institutions, i.e. the legal status of the Republic of Croatia had any validity in the "protected areas".
By UN Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992, the Secretary General undertook to set up UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) and to deploy them as soon as possible in the crisis areas in keeping with the peace plan. It was stipulated that the duration of the operation would be 12 months, unless the Security Council subsequently decided otherwise. This Resolution once again stressed that the UN peace- keeping plan and its implementation were in no way intended to prejudice an ultimate political solution, but it called on Yugoslavia to co-operate in the Conference on Yugoslavia with the object of arriving at a political settlement in accordance with the principles of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. The reference to the principles of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation as the basis for a political settlement was a new and very important element, for it laid the foundation for the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia, and, indirectly, for UNPROFOR operations, since the UN's prescription of this basis for the Conference on Yugoslavia necessarily applied a fortiori to the actions of UN organisations such as UNPROFOR. The principles of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation apply, for instance to the inviolability of frontiers, the situation of minorities, respect for human rights, etc. and might constitute important guidelines in connection with obscurities and contentious interpretations of the peace-keeping plan.
Unfortunately, this was not sufficiently borne in mind in drafting the operational plan, which adhered to the Vance plan of December 1991, when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the sole legal entity under international law: the operational plan was designed as a plan for Yugoslavia and not as a plan for Croatia, which had in the meantime become a new, legitimate, internationally recognised political factor with recognised state frontiers. The command headquarters of UNPROFOR were located in Sarajevo, its logistical bases were seated in Banja Luka, Belgrade and Zagreb, while the engineering battalion for the support of units in Croatia was stationed in Banja Luka. In reply to Croatian objections that the operation was designed for Croatia and that the Republic of Croatia was now an internationally recognised state with its own frontiers, it was invariably stated that the UNPROFOR operation would not prejudice a political settlement, although it was obvious that this response itself prejudiced the political settlement that had already been arrived at. As far as the stationing of UN forces was concerned, this was always represented as a purely technical military issue and hence the responsibility of the UNPROFOR command, although it obviously had important political implications.
The stationing of UN command headquarters in Sarajevo was an eloquent expression of the ill-judged nature of the entire operation and of a number of other factors not directly connected with the peace-keeping mission. The fact that the choice of Sarajevo and Banja Luka was a major blunder was illustrated by the problems of communication that cropped up, especially after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began, forcing UNPROFOR to move its headquarters, first to Belgrade and then to Zagreb, with the logistic base from Banja Luka also moving to Zagreb. This entailed long delays in the deployment of forces and in the assumption of responsibility for the "protected areas" - not to mention the additional cost. These errors were a result of adhering rigidly to the initial plan, with no account being taken of changes in the international situation, and also a consequence of a wrong estimation of the political and military circumstances.
The "protected areas" in Croatia, which, incidentally, do not constitute an integral geographical entity, are divided into four operational sectors. UNPROFOR was meant to occupy the entire "Protected" territory in depth, and not just hold a cease-fire line. After a withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army they were meant to disarm any remaining military forces, to ensure permanent demilitarisation, to help set up civilian authorities and to assist the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. For these purposes 12 infantry battalions were deployed: 2 in the Eastern Sector (along the Danube), 4 in the Western Sector (in western Northern Sector (in central Croatia) and 3 in the Southern Sector (in Lika and northern Dalmatia). The military force also included a headquarters regiment, a traffic control unit, an engineering battalion, and a medical unit. To this personnel must be added 100 military observers, whose job was supposed to be the supervision of demilitarisation. Once they had done the job in Croatia, they were supposed to be transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina to control the frontier territory adjoining Croatia.
As far as the police contingent of UNPROFOR was concerned, it was decided initially to station 530 police officers in the "protected areas", but this number was subsequently somewhat reduced. A relatively small number of civilian employees were recruited locally.
The total number of personnel engaged in UNPROFOR in Croatia peace-keeping was about 14,000, and it was one of the most extensive operations ever undertaken by the United Nations. An annual budget of 608 million US dollars was approved. The units were lightly armed for purposes of self-defence only and were not authorised to use their weapons for any other purpose. The military strength of UNPROFOR was relatively modest in comparison with modern combat units of the same size, but its political, moral and psychological potential was much greater. In assessing the part played by UNPROFOR, account must always be taken of the major discrepancy between its military potential on the one hand and its moral influence on the other. Another essential feature of the force was that it was multinational, with contingents coming from different nations and traditions. UNPROFOR operations in Croatia involved troops from 27 countries.
Aggression on a New Scale
The date for UNPROFOR's take-over of responsibility for the "protected areas" was originally set for 25 April, but later postponed until the middle of May. Arrangements for the arrival of the troops and for their deployment proved to be more complicated than had been expected, and the battle for Sarajevo and constant violations of the cease-fire in Croatia caused additional difficulties. Heavy shelling of towns and cities in Croatia continued (Osijek, Vinkovci, Dubrovnik, Sibenik), and when the situation became somewhat quieter in Croatia, the war then flared up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which put UNPROFOR's peace-keeping operation into a totally different context.
This was because the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Croatia helped the Serbian attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina more than the achievement of peace in Croatia. Units of the Yugoslav Army were moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina and committed to the fighting there, leaving UNPROFOR to guard the "protected areas" against any attempt by the Croatian army to regain them. Besides, before withdrawing, the Yugoslav Army had handed over a large part of its weapons and ammunition to local Serbian paramilitary forces and had also transferred some of its troops to these forces. According to the peace plan, all these paramilitary forces should have been disarmed and demobilised, but this never happened. A small number of heavier weapons were stored under the formal supervision of UNPROFOR, but they were stored within reach of local militias. Demilitarisation, which was a vital part of the Vance plan, was never carried out in practice, for the withdrawal of troops and weapons merely contributed to the scale of the weapons remaining at the disposal of Serbian military formations in the "protected areas".
Moreover, feeling secure because of the presence of UNPROFOR, Serbian authorities in the "protected areas" continued a new form of aggression. They began a mass expulsion of the non-Serbian population from the occupied territories, looting and destroying their property, carrying out ethnic cleansing of these areas with the obvious intention of preventing the return of refugees and of creating conditions for the permanent separation of these areas from Croatia. The presence of UNPROFOR was exploited by the local Serbian authorities in order to block the implementation of the peace plan and to perpetuate the situation brought about by the Serbian attack on Croatia. In this way the UN protection force was used to protect the aggressors, instead of carrying out the peace plan and protecting the interests of the local population and the state to which these areas properly belonged. UNPROFOR was aware of this abuse and frequently protested, taking action to protect the threatened population, but this action never had more than a palliative effect. For the most part the members of UNPROFOR were helpless witnesses to the use of violence without any real chance of preventing it. The Serbian tactic was, by provoking incidents on the cease-fire line, to tic UNPROFOR down to this demarcation line, making sure that the Serbs would not be attacked from that quarter, and at the same time, that UNPROFOR would be unable to control what was happening elsewhere in the hinterland of the protected areas".
UNPROFOR made another major mistake in its interpretation of the Vance plan. By accepting the status of the local "civil authorities" it recognised illegitimate bodies set up in the wake of the aggression. The peace plan had spoken of setting up local authorities on the principle of proportional representation of local ethnic groups. In this respect UNPROFOR made no attempt to do anything at all, but merely accepted the existing arrangements and the local representatives. Besides, the Vance plan had spoken of "protected areas" in the plural, having in mind particular occupied areas of Croatian territory that had never known any other common superior authority than the authority of the Croatian state. UNPROFOR recognised as representative of the local authorities a self- styled "government" in Knin. Of course, UNPROFOR never formally recognised the so-called "Serbian Republic of Krajina" as a state, but by its relations with the Knin "government" it encouraged in the occupying power sense that it was in fact tolerated. UNPROFOR ought to have negotiated only with the authorities of individual communities, for that would have been the proper interpretation of the term local authorities".
Pink Zones
In discussions on the stationing of UNPROFOR in the "protected areas" an issue arose which went beyond the terms of the peace plan. Certain areas in Croatia which had been under the control of the Yugoslav Army were not meant to be included in the "protected areas". The Serbs asked for them to be included, but the Croats did not agree. In the end, however, Croatia consented to accept the aid of UNPROFOR, given the presence of Serbian paramilitary units that were in touch with similar units in the "protected areas", and in view of a threat from the Serbian side that they would reject the Vance plan outright.
On the occasion of a visit by Goulding long discussions were held on this issue. Under the Vance plan Croatia might have insisted that these areas should be handed over immediately and unconditionally to Croatia following the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army. In order to avoid a fresh outbreak of hostilities, however, Croatia agreed that UNPROFOR and the EC observer mission should assist in reinstating the Croatian authorities there. This was agreed to by the Secretary General of the UN on 26 June 1992, and he expressed his gratitude to the Croatian government for its flexibility in response to the efforts of the UNPROFOR commander-in-chief to find a solution to the problems of the "pink zones".
The UN's insistence on a special status for the "pink zones" was justified by the ethnically mixed character of these areas, a justification which did not appeal to the Croats, since the Croatian state had solemnly guaranteed respect for human rights and the rights of ethnic communities. Croatia nevertheless agreed to the suggestions of "pink zones", expecting that the UN and the EC would employ appropriate means to achieve an agreed solution. To carry out its mission in the "pink zones" UNPROFOR was given an additional 60 military observers and 120 civilian police officers to ensure the reinstatement of Croatian authority in agreement with the Croatian government and other interested parties. The conduct of this Security Council operation was placed under the supervision of an UNPROFOR representative as chairman of a joint committee which included representatives of the EC observer mission, the government of the Republic of Croatia and the local authorities. Once again the UN secretariat understood by "local authorities" the "government" of the selfstyled "Serbian Republic of the Krajina", so that the "pink zones", which the Security Council had decided should be returned unconditionally to the Republic of Croatia, were in fact placed under the authority of a "government" in Knin.
Once the Knin "government" was introduced into the Joint Committee and hence into the process of deciding the status of the "pink zones", the committee's attempt to carry out its mandate was totally frustrated. Instead of co-operating in implementing Security Council Resolution 762, the Serbian side declared that both the "protected areas" and the "pink zones" were part of a single "state" and tried to turn the ceasefire line into that "state's" frontier vis-a-vis Croatia. It thus explicitly rejected the Vance plan and Resolution 762. The Croatian side insisted that the Serbs should at once be presented with an ultimatum requiring them to collaborate in implementing the Resolution, or else the process of restoring Croatian sovereignty in the "pink zones" would continue without the Serbs (if it worst came to the worst, the Security Council would be informed that discussions had failed). The UNPROFOR representative, however, went on trying to persuade the Serbs to cooperate - without success. After several months had been wasted and there had been eight meetings of the Joint Committee and several meetings of a sub-committee, on 9 November 1992 even the UNPROFOR representative realised that not even the first step had been taken towards enforcing the Committee's mandate, and he suspended the Committee's activities. It has never met since then.
The "Forgotten Mandate"
The same thing happened in the "protected areas", where UNPROFOR's responsibility was greater and more direct. UNPROFOR looked on calmly as a Serbian "state" was established in Croatia, as a first step to its integration into other Serbian "states". In accordance with Security Council Resolution 769 of 7 August 1992, by which the recommendations of the Secretary General's report were endorsed, UNPROFOR was given a fresh mandate, namely to take over control of Croatia's international frontiers with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina wherever these frontiers coincided with the "protected areas" and the "pink zones". They would not only check the movement of weapons and munitions but also population movement and carry out customs controls. These instructions were of vital importance, since Serbian military units with all their arms and equipment were crossing into Bosnia and Herzegovina to take part in the war there and then returning unhindered to Croatia. The eastern sector bordering the Danube was being used on a large scale to break the sanctions the UN had imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this way control of Croatia's international frontiers by UNPROFOR might have made a major contribution to stopping the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and implementing the Vance plan in Croatia.
In fact, nothing was ever done to carry out this UNPROFOR mandate. Certain members of UNPROFOR in Sector East even themselves took part in breaking the embargo on imports into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Croatian territory under the protection of UNPROFOR was constantly subject to looting and the expulsion of nonSerbs, who were replaced by Serbian colonists. Since the arrival of UNPROFOR more than 600 Croats have been murdered and several thousand have been driven from their homes in Sector East alone. In the other sectors the last remnants of the Croatian population were "cleansed", either by massacre or by expulsion, with UNPROFOR offering no assistance other than by transporting refugees to territory under Croatian control. This applied also to the "pink zones", from which the Croats have been totally expelled.
Looked at overall, the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia has come nowhere near achieving the planned and expected results. Indeed, it has made it easier for the Serbian insurgents to impose their illegitimate rule, to set themselves up as the sole representatives of the Serbian population of the occupied territories, to carry out ethnic cleansing under UN protection, and virtually to annex Croatian territory to Serbia and the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The hesitation and blundering of UNPROFOR has given support to the aggressive action of the insurgent Serbs. The victims of aggression, whom UNPROFOR were supposed to help, were left defenceless, while the aggressor enjoyed protection which allowed him to pursue his aims to a successful conclusion. In this there can be no excuse for UNPROFOR.
In favour of UNPROFOR's one-year mandate is the fact that its presence reduced the scale of hostilities in Croatia and saved the country-from further destruction and even heavier loss of life. This would have been even more significant if Serbian aggression had not spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina, seizing and taking advantage of the advent of UNPROFOR which brought about a lull in the fighting in Croatia. It is a moot point whether Serbia could have waged full-scale wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina at the same time. As far as Croatia is concerned, even after the arrival of UNPROFOR, not one of the problems caused by the Serbian aggression and occupation has been solved. A question that increasingly worries the Croatian public in general, and those who have been driven from their homes in particular is how far the UN forces are in a position to guarantee peace, security and territorial integrity. The Croatian public expected of the international community, and the United Nations especially, the return of refugees and the peaceful establishment of legitimate government in the whole of Croatia so that they could carry on with the economic and social reform of their country and look forward with confidence to the future. And this is what they had been promised by resolutions of the United Nations. It is now clear that such hopes and expectations were totally unfounded.
Bearing this in mind, it is not difficult to understand the Croatian government's decision to regain an area round the bridge over Novsko Zdrilo (Maslenica bridge), breaking the deadlock and finding a practical solution for problems that ought to have been solved long ago by UN decisions. The area chosen was adjacent to the wrecked bridge, which was of vital economic importance as a line of communication for the whole of Croatia, especially for its southern region, and for humanitarian action in Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The campaign was limited to gaining control of a narrow strip of territory alongside the arterial road to Zadar, and it was located partly in a "protected area" and partly in a "pink zone". It was territory that had previously been inhabited almost exclusively by Croats. The action was limited so as to avoid drastic consequences for the peace process under the auspices of UNPROFOR. It was also intended to illustrate how essential it was for Croatia to solve the problem of the occupied territories, and to show that it was not inclined to wait indefinitely for a serious attempt to enforce Security Council decisions.
The reaction of UN and UNPROFOR to this campaign was unjustifiably severe. The Croatian side was accused of breaking the truce and resuming the war, with no allowance being made for the fact that Serbian attacks on Croatia had never stopped and that the Serbs had never honoured previous provisions of the peace plan and Security Council resolutions, which had involved a whole series of obligations on their side. Not only did the Serbs fail to fulfil their obligations, they refused even to discuss them, given the attitude of UNPROFOR, whose representatives behaved as if the establishment of a cease-fire was the only point of the peace process, and as if all the other arrangements aimed at bringing about a permanent peace were of secondary importance, their implementation being neither mandatory nor subject to a time limit. This one-sided view enabled the Serbs to block any action that might have developed from the ceasefire, and thus deprive the peace plan of any deeper or lasting significance. It was an attitude that did nothing to contribute to removing the causes of the armed conflict; on the contrary, it opened up the way for a rejection of the Vance plan and neglect of Security Council resolutions - and hence to a resumption of fighting.
In this respect the Security Council Resolution 802 of 25 January 1993 is defective. It accuses the Croats of adversely affecting the situation in Croatia through its attack on an area under the protection of UNPROFOR, although it concedes that the Serbs had refused to co operate in implementing the peace plan during the preceding months. If, then, the Serbs refuse to carry out Security Council decisions, and UNPROFOR has neither the mandate nor the means to make it do so, why should Croatia be obliged to tolerate indefinitely aggressive action on their part, the sole aim of which is to create a permanent basis for obstruction of the Vance plan? The requirement that the Croats withdraw their forces from the area liberated in the January action confirmed the Serbs in their refusal to co-operate. Even though they were also exhorted to co-operate unreservedly and unconditionally in carrying out the UN peace plan, which entailed the demobilisation of Serbian paramilitary forces. Withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces, as called for by the United Nations Security Council as a preliminary step to the resumption of the peace process, would have had precisely the opposite effect - the elimination of any real threat that would persuade the Serbs to give up their obstruction of the peace process.
Whether to Continue the Peace Process - and How?
Security Council Resolution 807 of 19 February 1993 goes some way towards correcting the one-sided condemnation of Croatia for breaking the cease-fire, although it does refer to Resolution 802 and earlier resolutions. It gives first priority, however, to the maintenance of the ceasefire. The Resolution expressly calls on both sides in the dispute and on others involved "to observe the UN plan for the maintenance of peace in Croatia along with other commitments they have made" but it still does not threaten any kind of real sanctions against the Serbs if they do not comply.
If the Croatian government considers the question of the overall implementation of the peace plan for Croatia in the context of an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, then it is bound to confront the UN with the following dilemma: will UNPROFOR carry out its obligations within the overall conception of the restoration of peace in Croatia, accepting the political implications of this solution, or will it go on preserving the status quo, thus enabling the insurgents to strengthen their position and impose a solution that runs counter to the arguments internationally accepted and embodied in UN documents? If UNPROFOR argues that its mission is a peace-keeping operation and that it can do nothing because the warring parties do not respect the ceasefire, then it would be only logical to seek a change in its mandate or else withdraw the force, instead of allowing the side which does not want peace under internationally agreed conditions to prolong the state of war indefinitely.
The cleft stick into which the UN had got itself was clearly illustrated in Security Council Resolution 815, in which, for the first time, at the end of March 1993, UNPROFOR's mandate was extended. The Security Council confirmed its "obligation to see that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia were respected" , but provided no means by which this could be done, simply exhorting the parties to the dispute to honour the cease-fire. The search for a solution was simply left to the international Conference on former Yugoslavia. The UN persistently ignored the problem that the insurgent side refused to admit that the areas under UN protection, and even the "pink zones", were an integral part of Croatia, and that this refusal was in fact tantamount to infringement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that Republic. If the insurgent so blatantly violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and publicly declares that this is its main aim and object, then it can hardly be expected that it will allow itself to be peacefully integrated into the constitutional framework of the Republic of Croatia. This is why other means of persuasion ought to be used. But when Croatia tried to apply pressure to this end, by liberating part of its occupied territory, in this same resolution the Security Council demanded the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and the Croatian authorities from that territory, threatening to impose sanctions, if Croatia did not comply. The absence of any idea, of forcing or any will to force the insurgents to observe Security Council resolutions is masked by a meaningless formula implying endless discussions, for which the presence of several thousand professional soldiers and policemen is hardly necessary.
On the occasion of the second extension of UNPROFOR's mandate by Resolution 847 of 29 June 1993, the Security Council once again stressed its determination to see that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia were respected, this time adding a demand that the railway line between Zagreb and Split, the motorway between Zagreb and Zupanja be reopened, that the Adriatic pipeline be brought back into commission and traffic across the Maslenica strait be resumed. Electricity and water supplies should be restored in all parts of Croatia, including the areas under UN protection. The resolution did not offer any plan by which UNPROFOR might achieve all this: once again it simply appealed to the good will and trust of the parties to the dispute. When the Croatian authorities tried to restore traffic across the Maslenica strait and opened the airfield at Zemunik, i.e. on territory under their control, they were given no support by UNPROFOR, which stuck to their position, that Croatia must withdraw from those areas, allegedly because it had regained control of them by force. A proposal from Croatia that UNPROFOR should take control of the communications and facilities in question was turned down, because it seemed UNPROFOR was not prepared to expose its troops to the risk of attack by the Serbs: they would accept responsibility only if the insurgents agreed. Such was UNPROFOR's concern for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia, and for a responsibility entrusted to it by several resolutions of the Security Council. In fact, it simply handed this responsibility over to the Serbian rebels.
Croatia is not satisfied with the attitude of UNPROFOR, nor with the evolution of the peace process, in which UNPROFOR was supposed to act as a vital catalyst. Croatia is being urged to accept the continued operation of UNPROFOR on its territory, with the prospect that its influence in bringing permanent peace to the region ill be less and less positive. UNPROFOR's mandate, as interpreted and carried out by UN officials, is more and more turning into the opposite of what was originally planned and defined, and Croatia is suffering increasing political damage. It is required to go on seeking a peaceful solution to its dispute with the insurgents among its population, while UNPROFOR activity is becoming less and less productive in the search for a peaceful solution. To begin with, UNPROFOR raised great hopes for the restoration of the peace and respect for human rights on the territory for which it was responsible, but it is now further than ever from achieving the objects of its initial mandate, and is losing more and more of its credibility as an impartial and effective authority.
Events in the recent past have confronted Croatia with a profound dilemma: whether to agree to a further extension of UNPROFOR's mandate and, if so, on what terms. As an independent and sovereign state, Croatia must insist on all decisions of the United Nations being implemented through clearly defined means and in accordance with the precise time-table for UNPROFOR's operations. Moreover, it must ask for the status of UNPROFOR in Croatia to be precisely defined in agreement with the government of the Republic of Croatia. It is essential that UNPROFOR operations in Croatia should be strictly distinguished from UN operations in other regions of the territory of what once was Yugoslavia, since the lack of such a distinction is liable to place Croatia in an ambiguous and disadvantageous position in regard to other countries. All UNPROFOR's actions must strictly respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, for this is the foundation of everything else and governs the functions of UNPROFOR that have been so often reiterated in Security Council resolutions. The desire for peace and co-operation must remain the principle of Croatian policy, but at the same time the legitimate and internationally recognised aims of the Republic of Croatia may not be neglected: to restore peace, security and democratic order on the whole of its territory.
Insistence on the implementation of the Vance plan for Croatia is normal and only to be expected, but it is not just a matter of form, it entails a hardening of attitude towards the Serbian side, which has not the slightest desire to co-operate in the acceptance of that plan. The deadline for UNPROFOR operations was ultimately extended to 30 August 1993, which is in fact a very brief term in which to achieve any significant advance in the realisation of the peace plan. Given the manifest failure of UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate during the past year, which was highlighted by the Croatian military operation, the extension of its mandate offers an opportunity for its review and modification. It would be unrealistic to expect that the peace process might be completed within the most recently specified term, but something fundamental might be done to restore confidence in UNPROFOR's efficacy and provide a basis for yet another extension of its mandate. This confidence has been restored up to a point by Resolution 871 of the Security Council, in which all the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia is confirmed. It is emphasised that sanctions imposed on the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will not be lifted until the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia stops supporting Serbian insurgents in Croatia and joins actively in the process of restoring peace in Croatia. The future will show to what extent this resolution will be speedily and effectively put into practice.
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