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CROATIA BETWEEN AGGRESSION AND PEACE

Authors: Zvonimir Baletic, Josip Esterajher, Milan
Jajcinovic, Mladen Klemencic, Andjelko Milardovic, Gorazd
Nikic, Fran Visnar
Editor:
Dr. Gorazd Nikic
Translator:
W.E. Yuill

Published by: AGM, Zagreb 1994


C O N T E N T S

  1. Introduction
  2. The Break-Up of Yugoslavia
  3. Were Croatia (and Slovenia) guilty of secession?
  4. Frontier and territorial issues
  5. The War Against Croatia
  6. UNPROFOR in Croatia
  7. A Proposal for the Implementation of the Vance Plan on the Territory of Croatia under the Protection of the United Nations (UNPA)

A PROPOSAL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANCE PLAN ON THE TERRITORY OF CROATIA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UNPA)

On 2 November 1993, in order to ensure the quickest possible implementation of UN Security Council Resolution no. 871 (and other resolutions to which it refers), the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman delivered to ambassadors of countries accredited to Croatia, and to responsible representatives of the Croatian press and media, the terms of a Peace Initiative. The text of the Peace Initiative (according to the Zagreb daily Vjesnik, 3 November 1993) reads as follows:

1. The Croatian government is prepared, within a period of 15 days to conclude an agreement with representatives of the local Serbian population on the cessation of all hostilities, offering then a guarantee of local cultural autonomy.

2. To that end we propose, within the same period, the announcement of the setting-up of a joint commission which will begin work on resolving all the issues referred to in the Vance plan, and on the implementation of the measures recommended in Security Council Resolution no. 871, with the collaboration of representatives of UNPROFOR and the European Community.

3. We propose that immediate steps be taken leading to the normalisation of the entire social and economic life of UNPA, i.e.:

3. 1. The opening without delay of all road and rail communications on the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia, in particular the road and rail links Zagreb-Knin, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Zupanja, Novska-Okucani-PakracDaruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-the Hungarian frontier, Osijek-Vukovar and Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, etc.

3.2. The return forthwith of all refugees to their places of residence under the supervision and with the active co operation and assistance of UNPROFOR and the government of Croatia.

3.4. The undertaking of measures to restore normal life in UNPA, including the restoration of all communications, the provision of supplies to the whole population, including the Serbian population (without discrimination) during the imminent winter season, the resumption of health care and social services, the normal functioning of schools, the supply of electrical energy, the re-appointment of all civil servants, and the incorporation of all other activities and the economy as a whole into the legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

3.5. The drafting of plans and the implementation of measures to include the UNPA on an equal footing in the economic rehabilitation of Croatia.

4. In order to arrive at a political solution of differences and normalisation of social life, Croatia is prepared, in the context of its constitutional order, to guarantee the applications in UNPA of all its legislation and also of all international conventions relating to the rights and liberties of the Serbian ethnic community. To this end it would undertake the following measures:

4.1. The granting of full local autonomy (self-government) within the terms of the Constitutional Law to the districts of Knin and Glina, where Serbs constitute a majority of more than half the population.

4.2. A guarantee of rights of cultural autonomy to the Serbian ethnic community throughout the entire territory of Croatia, in particular the rights to education in their own language and orthography, and the recording of place-names in two styles in areas where the Serbian community constitutes a majority of more than 50%.

4.3. The holding of elections for local - district and municipal - self-governing authorities under international supervision.

4.4. The establishment of special police jurisdiction in the districts of Knin and Glina in which the personnel will be recruited in accordance with the ethnic balance of the population as recorded in the most recent census.

5. A guarantee of full civil and political equality and effective protection of the civil and ethnic rights of Serbs and Croats in Croatia. Croatia is ready to accept the establishment of an international supervisory body and a special Court of Human Rights to which any citizen may appeal after he has exhausted the resources of the normal legal process. The districts of Knin and Glina will have the right to address constitutional appeals to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in order to protect their special rights, if they consider that their human rights or the rights of an ethnic community have been violated on their territory.

6. In order to ensure complete confidence in its good faith, Croatia is prepared to propose special international supervision by a mission appointed by the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. This mission would mediate between the majority and minority populations.

7. The Republic of Croatia is prepared to enter into any discussions on a political solution of outstanding problems except discussions that call in question the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.

* * *

Croatia has consistently tried to resolve the problem of relations with its neighbours peacefully. Although faced with Serbia's forcible violation of the constitution and a brutal choice offered to the Croats and other non-Serbian peoples of Yugoslavia - either Greater Serbia or else a centralised Yugoslavia - Croatia was prepared to offer a scheme for a confederative association of republics. But as the Serbia was not prepared even to consider this proposal, Croatia had no choice left but to vote for independence and democracy.

Armed conflict suited the interests of Croatia for less than any other solution. The country had been disarmed by the Yugoslav Army and faced an exceptionally powerful Serbian dominated army. The Croatian people were profoundly convinced that the democratic world, on the threshold of the 21st century, would not permit Serbian threats. But that is exactly what happened. A brutal military assault was launched on Croatia. The genocide, ethnocide and cultural destruction committed by Serbs in Croatia were not a consequence of the war but a planned method for the creation of a Greater Serbia. Not only did the democratic world fail to help in the defence of Croatia - with rather more foresight and determination the horrors of war might have been averted but the imposition of an embargo on arms imports deprived Croatia of any chance of defending itself. It was only at the cost of fearful casualties that Croatia won its independence and international recognition. But severe damage was inflicted in terms of human casualties and economic potential, while significant areas of Croatian territory are still under occupation. Although the international community condemned the aggression, emphasising the principle of the inviolability of the frontiers of internationally recognised states, by ignoring the actual situation on the ground and by unfounded optimism as to the achievement of a permanent peace, it created conditions encouraging aggression in other areas and nourished the aggressor's confidence that he would after all achieve his aims. Can aggression launched with impunity end in lasting peace and democratic order? The international community is apparently ready to lift the embargo on Serbia after the Serbs have achieved practically all they wanted, providing Serbia shows minimum good will and surrenders for instance to the Moslems in Bosnia - a few percent of the territory it has seized!

Perhaps it is not too late for the democratic world to grasp that it must, for its own sake, defend the principles it has declared, the principles on which international order is based, wherever they are violated in the world. The Second World War taught us this lesson plainly. For the dead, the dispossessed and the humiliated populations of these Balkan regions it may now be too late, but perhaps it will not be too late for the generations to come.


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