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Prof. dr. Joseph Bombelles professor at John Carrol University Cleveland, Ohio, USA DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS, RESETTLEMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CROATIA INTRODUCTION Ever since W.W.II, the birth rate in Croatia was declining until in the 1990’s when Croatia experienced a negative population growth. During the same time the Croatians were leaving Yugoslavia, in particular the mixed population areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in larger numbers than the Serbs or the Moslems. The "ethnic cleansing" during 1991-1995 totally removed the Croatian population from those and adjoining areas and thus completed the process! With the liberation of Croatia and large parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the problem arises of how to reverse those negative developments and create a better future for the population. The objectives of this paper are to investigate reasons for the decline in birth rates, and on the basis of that to suggest policies for the re-population of newly liberated areas, and for socio-economic development of the whole country. REASONS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS OF CROATIA The Second World War and its aftermath, with the massacre of the Croatian Army and the flight of its remnants to the West, caused severe demographic problems for Croatia. According to the census of 1948, the Croatian republic had the least number of men compared to women in the entire Yugoslavia. The pertinent figures were as follows: (TABLE 1) Thus, in the entire Yugoslavia there were 7,4 percent more women than men, while in Croatia there were 12 percent more women. There is little doubt that the loss of men resulted in proportionately fewer marriages and fewer children than in the rest of Yugoslavia. The second among the reasons for the small and declining birth rate in Croatia was the mass exodus of Croatian workers on the so-called "temporary work" in Western industrial countries. Permission of the Yugoslav Communist regime to its working class to go to work in capitalist countries of the West was essentially an open admission that the system was not able to solve employment problems of the country, and that its entire post-war concept of economic development was misdirected. TABLE 2: TOTAL POPULATION AND MIGRANT WORKERS BY REPUBLICS AND AUTONOMUS PROVINCES IN MARCH, 1971. Table 2 presents two sets of data about, as the Yugoslavs called them, the "Migrant Workers". The first sect was obtained at the Yugoslav census of March, 1971, and the second was an estimate by the Institute of Geography of the University of Zagreb. Members of the Institute claimed that the census missed a number of persons and thus their estimate is higher by some 118,592 person or 17.6 percent. Both sets of data indicate that the Republic of Croatia gave proportionately many more migrants than warranted by its population. Tables 3 and 4 and the subsequent tables indicate that the Croatian participated in the workers migration to a disproportionately higher rate than any other nation of Yugoslavia. all other constituent nations and minorities of Yugoslavia, except the Hungarians, participated in migration less then their share in population would warrant. In Bosnia, the Croatians made only 20.6 percent of the total population, but gave 42.2 percent of all migrants, while in their own republic they made 79.4 percent of the population but gave 86.9 percent of all migrants. On the other hand, the Serbians were proportionately under-represented in migration in all republics and regions. For example, in Bosnia they were 37.2 percent of the population but gave only 29.8 percent of the migrants, and in Kosovo the shares were 18.4 and 15.7 percent. Table 5 presents data on participation of the Croatians and the Serbians in the population and migration by counties in Croatia. TABLE 5. PARTICIPATION OF THE SERBS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND IN THE IMIGRATION CROATIAN REPUBLIC Among the Yugoslav Republics, Croatia had by far the highest migration rate average. that Republic alone furnished 33.4 percent of all Yugoslav migrants. Even in their own Republic, the Croats had a higher participation in migration (86.9 percent) than in the total population (79.4 percent). The second largest group in the Republic, the Serbs, represent 14.2 percent of the population but had only 8.5 percent participation in the migration. All other nationalities are represented by far less than 5 percent of the total population. From 105 countries in Croatia, in 89 the Croats had a higher migration rate than the Serbs. In the 16 counties in which the Serbs had a higher migration rate, their population was less than 5 percent of the total. At these low participation rates, the calculated migration rates become meaningless. Thus, for example, the highest Serbian migration rate of 13.0 percent was the town of Klanjec, where the total Serbian population was 23 from which 3 persons became migrants. Of 13 counties in which the total migration rates were 7.5 or higher, in 11 the Croats have the population majority and in the remaining two their population participation rates were 43.4 percent (Benkovac) and 22.6 percent (Vrginmost) respectively. In all of them the Croats’ migration rates are substantially higher than the Serbian. the range in the migration rates for the Croats was from 19.0 (in Imotski) to .6 (in Buzet), while for the Serbs it was from 8.9 (in Vrginmost) to 0 (in Lastovo) Of 11 countries in Croatia that had Serbian population majority, in two (Donji Lapac, Vojnic) the Croats represented less than 5 percent of the population. The difference between the Croatian and Serbian migration rate in the remaining 9 counties is visible from the following Table. (TABLE 6) The case of Gracac is a particularly striking one. Here some 20 percent of the population provides 65.8 percent of migrant workers, while over 76 percent of the population provides only 33.6 percent of migration. Numerical data leave no doubt that the Croatians represented proportionately the largest group among the migrants who went abroad. the question is why was it so? The official Yugoslav sources gave the following explanation of migration to the west phenomenon:
All of these reasons were valid for every nation of former Yugoslavia and they did not explain why the Croatians left in such disproportionate numbers. It was further added that the Croatians live very close to the West and that they have a long emigration history, and therefore there is no wonder that they were most attracted to work abroad. This, however, is not a valid argument. The Slovenians have a much larger emigration history and live much closer to the West than the Croatians, but their migration rate was substantially lower than the Croatian rate. It seems that real reasons for the disproportionately high emigration of the Croatians have to be sought in two directions. First are the economic policies in the Croatian Republic dictated by the federal government of Yugoslavia, and the second is the political position of the Croatians in the federation. There were two dominant economic policies in Croatia between 1945 and 1980. One of them was substantial withdrawal of financial and other resources from Croatia for the benefit of less developed republics. Consequently the rate of investment in Croatia was lower than in the other republics and his meant less construction and less employment. Another problem was that the investment policy was directed mostly toward heavy industries which enabled relatively few employment opportunities. On the political side of the problem it seems that there was a direct discrimination toward the Croatians in employment as well as in apartment distribution, even in Croatia, with a much worse situation in Bosnia and Vojvodina. It is known and documented that the Croatians had very limited access to jobs in the Yugoslav Army, police, diplomacy and other sensitive jobs, but the discrimination went far beyond that and was conducted even in employment policies of large Croatian enterprises in which position went very frequently to the Serbs. The situation was far worse for the Croatians in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In that Republic the Moslems were the largest group with 39.6 percent of the population (and 26 percent of migrant workers) followed by the Serbs with 37.2 percent of the population (and 29.8 percent of the migrant workers) and the Croats with 20.6 percent of the population (and 42.4 percent of the migrant workers). (See Table 4) If we consider data by counties and disregard the position of the group with less than 5 percent of the population, out of the total of 103 counties in Bosnia-Hercegovina, The Croats had the highest migration rate in 59, the Serbs in 19, and the Moslems in 24 counties.1 In one county, the Serbs and the Moslems had the same migration rate. For the Republic as a whole, the Moslems had a lower migration rate than the Serbs. Eleven out of 103 counties had migration rates of 7.5 or higher. Seven out of these 11 had Croatian population majority of over 65 percent, while the remaining four had a substantial Serbian majority. The range in the migration rates was for the Croats from 18.5 (Duvno) to 2.1 (Sarajevo), for the Serbs from 9.8 (Srbac) to .3 (Travnik), and for the Moslems from 8.9 (Banovici) to .4 (Srebrenica). In counties in which all three nations were strongly represented, the differing migration rates become rather indicative. (See Table 7). They leave no doubt that the Croats participated in the migration to a much higher extent than any other group. The question is, why? How can one explain the fact that in many counties and even many villages where the Croats and the Serbs live, side by side, the former have two, there or more times higher migration rates than the latter? One is led to the conclusion that a number of employment possibilities which were open to the others were not open to the Croats and so they left to work abroad at that time. There were practically no private employers in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and outside of agriculture the government dominated sector was the only possible employer. TABLE 8: NATURAL INCREASE OF POPULATION IN THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC 1960-1989 What were the consequences of the higher migration rate and political discrimination for the Croatians? In Croatia, during the thirty year period between 1960 and 1989, the natural increase of population was declining and in the early 1990’s turned into a decline. (See Table 8). In the area of mixed population which later on became the so-called Krajina region, the situation was particularly bad for the Croatians. (See Tables 9 and 10). Had Yugoslavia survived for another twenty years it is very probable that even without the "ethnic cleansing" there would have been no Croatians left in that region. TABLE 10: NUMERICAL LOSSES OF THE CROATINA POPULATION IN THE 8 COUNTIES OF CROATIA BETWEEN 1971 AND 1991. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the Croatian share in the total population dropped from 21.7 percent in 1961 to 17.3 percent in 1991. By counties the Croatian share in population declined between 1971 and 1991 in Mostar from 36.8 to 33.8 percent, in Tuzla from 25.9 to 15.6 percent, in Zenica from 21.9 to 15.6 percent, and in Stolac from 36.6 to 33.1 percent. Similar declines occurred in most other counties. CONCLUSION The first of those reasons the massacre of surrendered soldiers of the Croatian Army and exodus of its remnants to the West after W.W.II. The second reason was the mass exodus of Croatian workers and emigrants during the 1960 and 1970’s. In both of those cases participants were mostly, but not exclusively, males in the age bracket 18 to 45. Women of the same age also participated in worker migration but in smaller proportions. Since 18 to 45 is the age when people from families and have children, it is no wonder that a loss of this segment of the population lowered birth rates in Croatia and in the Croatian parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Many of those emigrants and migrants formed their families abroad and had their children in foreign countries. It seems that a particularly great political and economic pressure on the Croatian population occurred in the "mixed areas" where it lived together with a sizable Serbian and/or Moslem population. The current war and the so-called "ethnic cleansing" brought additional demographic losses and problems to the Croatians. The end of the current war will bring new deep demographic changes on territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Croatians were expelled from Eastern Bosnia and Hercegovina and most parts of Central Bosnia. The Serbs left the Krajina region and Western Bosnia and will probably leave the Eastern Slavonia. As much as we would want this to happen, there is little hope that the majority of both populations will return to their old areas. This raises several important questions for Croatia. First, how to repopulate the Krajina region and Western Bosnia-Hercegovina; and second, what kind of economic policy would be most stimulating to economic and demographic revival of these areas. The fate of several hundreds of thousands families and probably the whole nation will depend on the kind of answers the Croatian and Bosnian governments will provide. There are two large groups of Croatians who could provide settlers for these areas. The first group make the displaced Croatian from Eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina and parts of Central Bosnia which is essentially rural population; and the second group is made of the Croatian emigrants and workers in Western Europe and oversees countries. It goes without saying that the first group, which currently lives in temporary shelters, should be resettled as fast as possible. For them this is a question of life and death. This process will require substantial resources for housing, agricultural implements and infrastructures. The reintegration of the emigrants and workers from abroad presents a much more complicated problem. They were living for decades in modern industrial countries of the West, they raised their families there, they acquired various trades and professions, saved some money, and were accustomed to a higher standard of living. Above all they understand workings of the capitalist economic system and have acquired work habits necessary for survival in that system. With each year they spend in foreign countries, there is less likelihood that they will want to return home. Yet, they represent a great asset for Croatia. No other country in Eastern Europe has such a large proportion of its population in the West. No other country has so many university trained specialists, skilled workers, professionals and tradesmen abroad as does Croatia. They represent human capital which, given the resources, could relatively quickly transform Croatia into a modern economy. They have the know-how, work ethic, some capital, and I am sure that German, Austrian and French banks would gladly help their return to Croatia. While the other countries in Eastern Europe have yet to train their population for life in the new socio-economic system, and create new work habits and capital, Croatia already has some 10 percent of the population which for decades lived in modern economies and who can greatly speed up integration of Croatia into European Community. of course, provided that it returns home. What should be done to encourage and hasten the return of the emigrants and workers from abroad and their reintegration into the economy? There are four suggestions that come readily to mind. 1. Rapid establishment and development of socio-economic system similar to the one in the European Economic Community. Economic freedoms, legal security and infrastructure are unavoidable conditions for return of emigrants and workers. People who worked most of their lives to save some money will not return home and invest that money if there is a possibility that they will lose it because of wrong government policies or incompletely structured economic and legal systems. 2.returnees to the settlement areas should be offered cheap credit for opening of private enterprises, free building lots for new housing, and other inducements. 3.As soon as practicable, and after former owners have been compensated, a new agrarian reform should be implemented. On abandoned land and land of big state and socially owned enterprises, new private family farms of some 25 hectares of fertile land should be created. In areas where land is less productive larger farms should be formed. Holland may serve as a model for this process. In that country every few years new areas for farming settlement are created on the land taken from the sea. 4.A great effort should be made to attract foreign capital to help in speeding up reconstruction and economic growth of the country and thereby also increase employment. With war damages of some $20 billion in Croatia alone, corresponding to one year GNP of the country, there will be great needs and opportunities to take care of. By adopting those and similar measures, Croatia would hopefully be able to create conditions for normal life of its population, enable return of its emigrants and workers from abroad, and thus solve some of her demographic problems. However, for this to happen determined governmental actions are necessary. The future of Croatia will be bright only if the Croatians make it so. After the successful battle for political liberations must come strong efforts for economic development and demographic healing. Only an unqualified success in these two areas will ensure survival and prosperity of Croatia. FOOTNOTE 1 Ivo Baucic, op. cit. str. 153-155 Jevrem Brkovic: Montenegro - The First Victim of Greater Serbia Aggression Sve obavijesti oknjigama mozete dobiti putem E-Mail adrese: |
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